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“Doing what’s right isn’t the problem. It is knowing what’s right.”
Lyndon B. Johnson1

I. INTRODUCTION: CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY
AND THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
U.S. and multinational companies operating in developing
countries recognize the importance of contributing to the local
communities in which they operate. The importance of donations
related to corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) to local
1. Today in History: Aug. 27, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 27, 2012,
http://www.timesdispatch.com/news/today-in-history-aug/article_32314529-b5445330-a8ae-a177e501d42c.html.
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communities is growing, and today companies and shareholders alike
recognize CSR contributions as important and valuable corporate
goals.2 In addition, local communities around the world where these
companies operate and profit expect these companies to give back to
the local communities in some way.3
The obligation to contribute to the local communities in which
they operate covers companies working in a wide variety of
industries around the developing world. Extractive industries (oil,
gas, and mining) face unique pressures due to the perceived
environmental impact of their operations and the political realities
involved in the extraction and export of valuable natural resources,4
but other industries face similar pressures to contribute.
Pharmaceutical and medical companies are encouraged to contribute
to local community health by donating products or services, and even
companies operating in the retail supply chain are encouraged to
contribute to, for example, occupational health and safety initiatives
in manufacturing countries.5 The collapse of a garment factory in
Bangladesh in 2013 and the call thereafter for clothing retailers to
contribute more funds to ensure the safety of manufacturing facilities
provides a recent example of how failure to respond to local requests
to give back to the community can result in damaging and unwanted

2. See ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 57
(2004) (identifying fifty-five companies promoting CSR).
3. See, e.g., id. at 56 (identifying the Stride Rite Company, which is praised
for its corporate citizenship, opting to move its manufacturing jobs outside of lowincome domestic areas to foreign countries with lower employment costs).
4. See, e.g., Jedrzej George Frynas, Corporate Social Responsibility in the Oil
and Gas Sector, 2 J. WORLD ENERGY L. & BUS. 178, 181 (2009), available at
http://jwelb.oxfordjournals.org/content/2/3/178.full.pdf+html?sid=601a8c0a-d53e4b04-9508-efc38f709931 (describing the Exxon-Valdez oil tanker accident, antiShell protests in Nigeria, and alleged BP human rights abuses in Colombia).
Political forces can exploit the environmental impact of extractive operations on
local populations, heightening the importance of those operations’ tangible
contributions to local populations. See David B. Spence, Corporate Social
Responsibility in the Oil and Gas Industry: The Importance of Reputational Risk,
86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59, 69–70 (2011).
5. See Howard Husock, The Bangladesh Disaster and Corporate Social
Responsibility, FORBES (May 2, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
howardhusock/2013/05/02/the-bangladesh-fire-and-corporate-social-responsibility/
(noting that Walmart gave $1.8 million for the training of Bangladesh plant
managers in safety techniques following a factory fire).
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media attention.6 Pressures to donate to local communities are further
enhanced in some countries by existing xenophobic tensions between
foreign companies and local governments.7
Actual examples of risky donation scenarios companies have
recently faced include the following:


the requirement that a company construct an orphanage in one
West African country and use a specific contractor or supplier
selected by a local official to do so;



a request that a company donate several tons of concrete and
trees for the paving and landscaping of a municipal square in
Mexico prior to receiving an operational license;



a request by local tribal officials in sub-Saharan Africa that a
company contribute to a community fund managed by those
tribal officials; and



the requirement that a company donate to a local development
fund in Asia in exchange for tangible business support. 8

Contributions to local governments and communities are not
prohibited by the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”).9
Nevertheless, some such contributions can fall within the FCPA’s
prohibitions, and companies face practical challenges to ensure such
contributions do not lead to FCPA liability. Identifying connections
between recipient charities or communities and local officials can be
difficult; additionally, demands that companies donate to specific
projects or development funds further exacerbate uncertainty and
risk. While in principle the FCPA only applies to payments made to
6. Id.
7. See Yuriy Humber, Chalco Targeted as Mongolia Seeks to Limit State
Deals, BLOOMBERG (May 17, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-0516/chalco-targeted-as-mongolia-seeks-to-limit-state-deals.html; Devon Maylie,
World News: Mining Debate Rattles South Africa – Unions Renew Push for
Nationalization as Companies Plan Cuts to Cope with Slowing Demand, WALL ST.
J., May 16, 2013, at A8.
8. Confidential client scenarios.
9. FCPA: A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST. & SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM’N 16 (Nov. 14, 2013),
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf [hereinafter FCPA Resource
Guide]. The FCPA technically applies only to payments made to officials, not to
governments. Id. at 20.
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officials and does not apply to payments made to governments,
FCPA enforcement trends show that regulators take a broad view of
what constitutes a payment to a foreign official, and even intangible,
non-financial benefits can be viewed as actionable under the
statute.10 Under the current enforcement regime, a fine line separates
legitimate CSR contributions from “corrupt” payments, where
regulators can view donations as a way to “please” local officials
with potential ability to influence the company’s business.11
Despite the uncertainty, there are practical ways for companies to
manage the risk of CSR contribution regimes.12 Nevertheless, lack of
clarity on when CSR contributions can lead to FCPA liability
remains, despite the publication of the U.S. Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) FCPA Guidance (the “Guidance” or the “DOJ’s 2012
Guidance”) in November 2012.13 This article addresses the practical
challenges facing companies operating in developing countries today
in the corporate-philanthropy arena. Part II provides an overview of
the DOJ’s 2012 Guidance, DOJ opinion releases, and FCPA
enforcement actions as they relate to CSR contributions and
donations. Part III discusses the practical challenges companies face
given the lack of clarity in the current FCPA legal and enforcement
regime, and Part IV maps out practical ways companies can mitigate
risk in their CSR contribution programs. Finally, Part V proposes
alterations to the FCPA enforcement regime that would provide
greater clarity to corporations while still maintaining robust
prohibitions on corrupt payments to foreign officials.

II. DONATIONS AND THE FCPA: THE LAW
The FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions14 prohibit a corrupt offer,
10. See Final Judgment, SEC v. Schering-Plough, No. 04-0945 (D.D.C. 2004);
see also Complaint, SEC v. Schering-Plough, No. 04-0945, 1 (D.D.C. 2004)
[hereinafter Complaint, Schering-Plough] (prosecuting payments made to a bona
fide charity founded by a foreign official).
11. Complaint, Schering-Plough, supra note 10, at 4.
12. See infra Part IV.
13. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 9, Foreword.
14. The FCPA is comprised of two sets of provisions: (1) the anti-bribery
provisions and (2) the accounting provisions. See The Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2012). The accounting provisions set broad
requirements for companies to keep and maintain accurate books and records and
put in place appropriate internal controls to ensure their books are accurate. See
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promise, or payment of anything of value to a foreign (non-U.S.)
official, directly or indirectly, made for the purpose of obtaining or
retaining business.15 U.S. regulators have taken a broad jurisdictional
view of the anti-bribery provision of the FCPA; the law applies to
U.S. persons or entities, U.S.-listed companies, agents of U.S.
companies, and aiders and abettors of U.S. companies.16 The FCPA
provision further applies to non-U.S. companies that take an “act in
furtherance” of a violation in the U.S.17
The FCPA itself does not specifically address the question of CSR
contributions or donations. However, the DOJ’s 2012 Guidance does
touch upon the topic, as do several DOJ Opinion Releases from the
past eight years. In addition, two FCPA settlements (including one
from 2013) have included CSR contributions or donations as conduct
charged under the FCPA donations to charities.

A. DOJ’S 2012 GUIDANCE
The DOJ’s Guidance on the FCPA, published in November 2012,
briefly addresses donations as well as whether CSR contributions
could fall within the statute’s ambit.18 There, the DOJ notes that
“[t]he FCPA does not prohibit charitable contributions or prevent
corporations from acting as good corporate citizens.”19 The DOJ
further emphasizes that “[t]he FCPA prohibits payments to foreign
officials, not to foreign governments.”20 However, the Guidance
cautions that, despite the fact that the FCPA does not technically
apply to payments made to governments or governmental entities,
FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 9, at 38–39 (focusing primarily on the antibribery provision, which is the provision that regulates the giving of improper
payments to foreign officials).
15. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1; Reagan R. Demas, Moment of Truth: Development
in Sub-Saharan Africa and Critical Altercations Needed in Application of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Other Anti-Corruption Initiatives, 26 AM. U.
INT’L L. REV. 315, 330 (2011) [hereinafter Demas, Moment of Truth] (giving a
more detailed overview of the specific provisions of the FCPA); Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act: An Overview, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/criminal/
fraud/fcpa/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2013) [hereinafter FCPA Overview].
16. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a) (defining jurisdictional view of anti-bribery
provision in Foreign Corrupt Practices Act).
17. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 9, at 4.
18. Id. at 19.
19. Id. at 16.
20. Id. at 20.
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“companies contemplating contributions or donations to foreign
governments should take steps to ensure that no monies are used for
corrupt purposes, such as the personal benefit of individual foreign
officials.”21
The Guidance fails to provide additional detail on whether such a
personal benefit in the context of donations must be tangible, or if
other non-financial benefits could qualify. For example, could the
donation and construction of a school in a key voting district,
requested by a politician running for reelection, qualify as something
of “value” given for a corrupt purpose? In this hypothetical, the
politician would receive no direct financial or in-kind benefit from
the school construction, but any politician would tell you that votes
in a key swing district are certainly something of “value.”22
Something of “value” normally refers to tangible financial or in-kind
benefits.23 However, U.S. courts have broadly construed the concept
of a “thing of value” when analyzing other criminal statutes to
include intangible things.24
After discussing several cases and opinion releases that have
touched upon charitable giving and the FCPA,25 the Guidance
concludes that “[l]egitimate charitable giving does not violate the
FCPA.”26 Unfortunately, the Guidance does not provide significant
guidance or detail as to when a contribution is or is not “legitimate.”
Instead, it concludes that avoiding FCPA liability in this context
“merely requires that charitable giving not be used as a vehicle to
conceal payments made to corruptly influence foreign officials.”27
In short, the DOJ’s 2012 Guidance alerts companies operating in
21. Id.
22. Whether this hypothetical would be viewed by U.S. regulators as a
potential violation of the FCPA would likely hinge on whether the official had the
authority and ability to benefit the business of the contributing company, and
whether the official actually provided or promised a business advantage to the
company in exchange for the school contribution.
23. Justin Serafini, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 721,
731 n.60 (2004).
24. See John P. Giraudo, Charitable Contributions and the FCPA: ScheringPlough and the Increasing Scope of SEC Enforcement, 61 BUS. LAWYER 135, 152
n.143 (2005) (citing United States v. Sheker, 618 F.2d 607, 609 (9th Cir. 1980)).
25. See infra Parts II.B–C.
26. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 9, at 19.
27. Id.
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developing jurisdictions that, while donations themselves are not
prohibited by the FCPA and payments to governmental entities (as
opposed to officials) are not covered by the FCPA, such payments
can be diverted and end up accruing to the personal benefit of an
official. Such diversion could lead to FCPA liability for the
contributing company. Companies should therefore take tangible
steps to look beyond the recipient of donations and CSR
contributions and confirm that such contributions do not end up
lining the pockets of individual officials. Fortunately, some of these
steps have been specifically delineated in DOJ FCPA Opinion
Releases.

B. DOJ OPINION RELEASES28
While the DOJ’s 2012 Guidance does not address donations or
charitable contributions in great detail, approximately one out of
seven of the DOJ FCPA Opinion Releases since 1993 have related to
the subject of CSR contributions.29 Opinions released in 1995, 1997,
2006, 2009, and 2010 all involved companies seeking a commitment
from the DOJ that proposed donations or charitable contributions
would not be actionable under the FCPA.
1. 1995 Opinion Release
In 1995, the DOJ approved a proposed $10 million contribution
for construction of a medical facility in South Asia.30 The donation
was to be made “through a charitable organization incorporated in
28. DOJ Opinion Releases are mechanisms by which companies or individuals
can disclose proposed transactions or payments to the Department and request that
the DOJ confirm in advance that such payments will not be viewed as a violation
of the FCPA. The Opinions are narrowly tailored, apply only to the specific facts
presented by the requesting company, and are typically conservative in their
approach, requiring companies to take significant protective measures in exchange
for the DOJ’s commitment that such transactions will be immune from later
prosecution. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Opinion Procedure, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST. (July 1, 1999), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/frgncrpt.pdf
(last visited Nov. 25, 2013) [hereinafter FCPA Opinion Procedure].
29. Approximately thirty-four FCPA Opinion Releases, five of which related to
charitable contributions. Fraud Section Home Index to Releases, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/index/ (last visited Nov. 25,
2013).
30. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review, No. 95-01 (Dep’t of Justice Jan. 11,
1995) [hereinafter FCPA 1995 Review].
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the United States” and thereafter be passed on to a public company in
the South Asian nation.31 The DOJ confirmed that it would not “take
any enforcement action with respect to the prospective donation”
based on three key factors. First, the company planned to require all
officers of the recipient U.S. charity and the South Asian public
company to sign certifications confirming the funds would not be
used in violation of the FCPA.32 Second, the company represented
that no individuals affiliated with the charity and South Asian
recipient company would be “affiliated with the foreign
government.”33 Finally, the company represented that it would
“require audited financial reports from the U.S. charitable
organization, accurately detailing the disposition of the donated
funds.”34
While the 1995 DOJ Opinion confirms that “implementing
safeguards and conducting due diligence on a donee organization are
good ways of minimizing the risk of FCPA violations,”35
extrapolation of the 1995 Opinion to other scenarios is limited
because the donation in that case was made via a U.S. charity, not
commonly an option for companies making CSR contributions in the
field.36 Moreover, depending on the amount of the contribution,
obtaining audited financial reports detailing the disposition of
donated funds can be impractical for companies donating to
charitable causes in developing nations.
2. 1997 Opinion Release
In a 1997 release, the DOJ stated it would not take enforcement
action against a planned $100,000 donation by a U.S.-based utility
company.37 The donation, which was to be made towards the
construction of a school in an Asian country, would not cover the full
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Keith M. Korenchuk et al., Guarding Against Anti-Corruption Problems in
Overseas Philanthropic Activities, TAXATION OF EXEMPTS 19, 22 (2011), available
at http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents/Arnold&PorterLLP_
TaxationOfExempts_November-December2011.pdf.
36. See FCPA 1995 Review, supra note 30, at 1.
37. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review, No. 97-02 (Dep’t of Justice
Nov. 5, 1997) [hereinafter FCPA 1997 Review].
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cost of the school and was to be made “directly to the government
entity responsible for the construction and supply of the proposed
elementary school.”38 The company confirmed that it would require a
written agreement with the government certifying that the funds
would be used only for the school construction and setting other
conditions to ensure the school would be built, staffed, and
appropriately utilized.39 Nevertheless, the DOJ made clear that its
approval of the donation was based on the fact that the contribution
was to be made “directly to a government entity—and not to any
foreign government official,” and therefore “the provisions of the
FCPA do not appear to apply to this prospective transaction.” 40 The
basis for this 1997 Opinion is not fully consistent with the DOJ’s
2012 Guidance, which makes clear that contributions to a
government entity could lead to liability under the FCPA where
insufficient diligence and monitoring is conducted by the
contributing party, and some or all of the contributed funds are
passed on to an official.41
3. 2006 Opinion Release
In 2006, a U.S. corporation (headquartered in Switzerland) asked
the DOJ to bestow its blessing on the corporation’s proposed plan to
donate to a fund to reward officials who vigorously enforced anticounterfeiting laws in an African country.42 The proposed $25,000
donation would be distributed by the African state government as
financial incentives for customs officials who catch and turn away
counterfeit products, many of which were counterfeits of products
made or distributed by the company requesting the DOJ opinion.43
In deciding that it would not take enforcement action relating to
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Compare id. (arguing that the FCPA did not apply because the donation
went to a government entity, not an official), with FCPA Resource Guide, supra
note 9, at 19 (expanding possible FCPA liability if funds can be misused,
regardless of the recipient of the donation, and highlighting the number of due
diligence and monitoring measures required to lessen the likelihood of an FCPA
violation).
42. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review, No. 06-01, 1 (Dep’t of Justice
Oct. 16, 2006).
43. Id.
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the proposed donation, the DOJ noted “a number of procedural
safeguards” the requestor planned to implement, including (but not
limited to):


payment of the funds by electronic transfer;



written confirmation from the African state that the funds were
received in a legitimate account;



the requesting company would have no part in choosing agents
who receive a financial award from the fund, but would ensure
that the funds were used only for the designated purpose and
only received by agents who were eligible according to
predetermined criteria;



the requesting company would “monitor the efficacy of the
incentive program” and discuss periodic refinements with the
African state;



the African state would retain records for five years relating to
distributed funds and would permit the requesting company full
access to those records.44

In addition, the DOJ noted that the requesting company agreed
that all items deemed counterfeit by customs agents in the country
would be examined by the company to confirm they were, in fact,
counterfeit.45 While the opinion did not label this safeguard as a
necessary requirement for DOJ approval, it would seem impractical
in most company donation scenarios for the donating party to
monitor every activity performed by a receiving charity to ensure
funds were appropriately spent.
Given the unique nature of the proposed donation outlined in the
2006 request,46 applying the terms of its approval to other donations
or charitable gifts provides limited assistance to companies seeking
clear guidance regarding CSR contributions under the FCPA.
4. 2009 Opinion Release
In 2009, a U.S. company requested and received DOJ approval for
44. Id. at 1–2.
45. Id. at 2.
46. Id. at 1–2.
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the donation of medical devices valued at $1.9 million to the
government of a foreign country.47 The foreign government asked the
requesting company to donate sample devices to government health
centers because the government was unfamiliar with the specific
devices and would need to be familiar with any devices that the
government might purchase in the future for subsidized sales to
patients.48 The DOJ cited a number of controls the U.S. company had
in place to ensure the donated devices would be provided to eligible
candidates via a predetermined, subsidized medical device
program.49 The DOJ also noted that there was “no reason to believe
that [a foreign official] will personally benefit from the donation.”50
In the end, the DOJ sanctioned the proposed donation because it
would “fall outside the scope of the FCPA in that the donated
products [would] be provided to the foreign government, as opposed
to individual government officials.”51 The DOJ’s reasoning here was
more consistent with its 2012 Guidance than was its 1997 opinion, in
that the DOJ noted there were assurances that the devices would
ultimately be given to “patient recipients selected in accordance with
specific guidelines.”52 The 2009 opinion does not, however, advise
what assurances would have been sufficient in this case, or the
minimum controls that would be expected for typical corporate
donations where the organized, predetermined guidelines that existed
in the medical device program are absent.
5. 2010 Opinion Release
In its most recent opinion release on the subject in 2010, the DOJ
sanctioned the proposed $1.42 million grant from a U.S.-based
nonprofit to a recipient local microfinance institution in a Eurasian
country.53 Local authorities compelled the grant as part of the
nonprofit’s attempt to reorganize its local subsidiary into a local

47. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review, No. 09-01, 2 (Dep’t of Justice Aug.
3, 2009) [hereinafter FCPA 2009 Review].
48. Id. at 1.
49. Id. at 2.
50. Id. at 3.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Review, No. 10-02, 2, 7 (Dep’t of Justice
July 16, 2010) [hereinafter FCPA 2010 Review].
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financial institution, and the recipient was to be chosen from a “short
list of institutions” provided by local regulators.54 In addition, a
foreign official sat on the Board of the local entity that was
ultimately selected as recipient of the funds.55
Despite the fact that regulators were compelling the local grants
and proposing the shortlisted recipient candidates, and despite the
fact that a foreign official was involved in the entity finally selected
for the grant, the DOJ endorsed the proposal.56 It did so citing a
number of significant (and onerous) controls that the requesting
nonprofit had put in place to ensure the granted funds were
appropriately received and utilized; these included prohibition on
compensation of local board members, institution of an anticorruption compliance program by the recipient, the staggered
payment of grant funds, and retention of an independent monitor to
audit the use of donated funds on an ongoing basis.57 The DOJ
primarily approved of the proposal because of the fact that the
nonprofit performed thorough due diligence on the shortlisted
recipients and put controls in place on the donated funds.58
The 2010 DOJ opinion cited several of its prior opinions relating
to charitable contributions,59 and suggested that those combined
opinions proposed reasonable and perhaps necessary due diligence
requirements in the charitable contribution context.60 The cited steps
included the following:


FCPA certification by the recipient;



due diligence on the recipient;



audited financial statements provided by the recipient;



a written agreement restricting the use of funds;

54. Id. at 2.
55. Id. at 3.
56. Id. at 2–3, 7.
57. Id. at 3–4, 6.
58. Id. at 5 (“Based on the due diligence that has been done and with the
benefit of the controls that will be put into place, it appears unlikely that the
payment will result in the corrupt giving of anything of value to such officials.”).
59. Id. at 6.
60. Id. at 7.
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due diligence on the recipient’s bank account;



confirmation that activities already funded were actually
completed before additional funds were donated; and



ongoing monitoring of the program. 61

Thus, the DOJ’s opinion provided clear and concise steps for
donating companies to consider. However, some of these steps
would be impractical in the typical CSR donation scenario for
companies operating in developing jurisdictions. For example,
obtaining audited financial statements from a Burmese community
development fund or an Equatorial Guinean local orphanage is not
likely, and rigorous monitoring of a recipient’s use of donated funds
is a time-intensive practice to which a smaller donating company
may be unable to commit. In such a scenario the company may
rationally choose not to donate at all rather than donate and assume
the responsibility of ongoing monitoring of the recipient’s activities.

C. CASES
Only two FCPA settlements have involved charitable
contributions, and both related to donations given to the same charity
in Poland.62 In 2004, Schering-Plough was charged with violating the
FCPA by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)
and paid a $500,000 penalty for contributions it made to a Polish
castle restoration charity.63 The SEC alleged that the $76,000 in
payments were made to influence the purchase of Schering-Plough’s
products in Poland, as the head of the charity was a Polish official
61. Id. at 6.
62. See Litigation Release No. 18740, SEC v. Schering-Plough Corp., No. 040945, June 9, 2004, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/
lr18740.htm [hereinafter Litigation Release, Schering-Plough]; Litigation Release
No. 22576, SEC v. Eli Lilly and Co., No. 1:12-cv-02045, Dec. 20, 2012, available
at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2012/lr22576.htm. While only two
FCPA settlements related to charitable contributions have been publicly settled,
many FCPA-related matters and cases are not made public, either because they
were never reported to U.S. regulators or because they were reported and
regulators declined to take action based on the reported facts. Therefore there may
have been—indeed, likely have been—other cases relating to charitable
contributions that have not been publicly disclosed through public filings or via a
public settlement with the DOJ or SEC.
63. SEC Litigation Release, Schering-Plough, supra note 62, at 1.
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who had the ability to approve the purchase of Schering-Plough’s
product. Although the recipient was a bona fide charity and there was
no allegation that the contributions were personally taken by the
official, U.S. regulators viewed the contributions as payments made
in exchange for “assistance from the government official.”64 Also
significant to regulators was the fact that the donations consumed
most of Schering-Plough’s donations budget “and were structured to
allow the [Schering-Plough] subsidiary to exceed its authorized
limits.”65 The SEC charged Schering-Plough with violations of the
internal controls and books and records provisions of the FCPA.66
In December 2012, the SEC charged Eli Lilly for, inter alia,
$39,000 in contributions made during the same time period to the
same Polish castle charity.67 The SEC allegations were virtually
identical to those against Schering-Plough, noting that Eli Lilly made
the donations in exchange for the same foreign official’s assistance
in encouraging the purchase of Eli Lilly products.68
The Schering-Plough and Eli Lilly cases were significant because
the recipient charity was bona fide, so standard due diligence alone
would not have cautioned against the donations. In addition, there
was no allegation that a foreign official personally received any
donated funds, which suggests that a foreign official need not
personally receive any portion of a payment where the payment to a
bona fide recipient is made “corruptly” for a “business purpose.”
While it seems clear the donations were made by Schering-Plough
and Eli Lilly as quid pro quo in exchange for the purchase of their
products,69 the only benefit apparently received by the official in this
case was the joy of knowing his charity was benefiting and the
64. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 9, at 17.
65. Id.
66. SEC Litigation Release, Schering-Plough, supra note 62, at 1.
67. See Complaint at 1, SEC v. Eli Lilly, No. 12-2045 (D.D.C. 2012)
[hereinafter Complaint, Eli Lilly].
68. Id. at 1–2 (explaining that the government official was in charge of
healthcare in the region and that Eli Lily was hoping that the government would
reimburse people who purchased its products).
69. See id. at 5 (describing how the government official concerned allocated
funds to publish healthcare institutions and then billed Eli Lilly for the
transaction); Complaint, Schering-Plough, supra note 10, at 4 (showing that the
Manager of the local Eli Lilly viewed payments to the charity not as donations,
“but as ‘dues’”).
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pleasure of knowing more Polish historic sites were being restored.70
As the SEC noted in its Eli Lilly complaint, Eli Lilly donated to the
charity knowing that it “was a project to which [the foreign official]
was devoted and lent much effort.”71

III.PRACTICAL APPLICATION: WHEN IS A
DONATION IMPROPER?
In light of the DOJ’s 2012 Guidance and relevant Opinion
Releases, as well as the SEC’s prosecution of charity cases against
Schering-Plough and Eli Lilly, companies creating CSR contribution
programs in developing countries want clear guidance on how those
programs should be set up to avoid potential federal criminal or civil
liability under the FCPA, as well as guidance on what makes a
donation improper under the FCPA. Although U.S. regulator
guidance has not been entirely consistent on the subject, we can draw
several clear conclusions from the guidance, while pointing out areas
of uncertainty.

A. DONATIONS TO UNKNOWN CHARITIES OR DONATIONS MADE IN
THE FACE OF “RED FLAGS”
It seems evident that donations to unknown charities, donations
made where no due diligence is performed on the recipient, and
donations made in spite of the presence of red flags regarding
connections with foreign officials, risk violating the FCPA in the
current enforcement environment due to the prosecutorial
interpretation of the act’s “knowledge” element. Payments made
70. The SEC charged Schering-Plough with violations of the accounting
provisions of the FCPA and not the anti-bribery provisions. Complaint, ScheringPlough, supra note 10, at 5 (alleging that Schering-Plough violated Sections
13(b)(2)(A) and (B) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). These accounting
provisions require U.S. listed companies to accurately record all transactions in
their books and records, and the SEC alleged that Schering-Plough improperly
recorded the Polish castle charity contributions in its books. Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §78dd (amended 1998). Unlike the anti-bribery
provisions, prosecution under the accounting provisions does not require an
allegation that a payment was made to a foreign official. Nevertheless, the
Schering-Plough case is of interest because it illustrates how U.S. regulators can
use the FCPA to prosecute charitable contributions that might not otherwise meet
the requirements of a more traditional anti-bribery violation.
71. Complaint, Eli Lilly, supra note 67, at 4.
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with “willful blindness” can result in liability where little or no due
diligence is performed or the payer had reason to believe the funds
might be routed to a foreign official personally.72 Additionally, where
a financial or in-kind benefit accrues to the foreign official (or the
official’s relative), directly or indirectly, the payment is clearly
covered by the FCPA anti-bribery provision.73 For example, where
funds are given to a bona fide charity but diverted to the foreign
official, the payment could implicate the FCPA in the absence of
appropriate due diligence and controls.

B. DONATIONS TO BONA FIDE CHARITIES
Less clear is the scenario where no financial or in-kind benefit is
given to a foreign official. Under what circumstances can a donation
to a bona fide charity that does not accrue to a foreign official trigger
liability under the FCPA? A plain reading of the anti-bribery
provisions of the FCPA suggests that such payments do not implicate
the FCPA.74 The FCPA requires that something “of value” be paid to
a foreign official, which “would seem to require that the foreign
official actually personally receive something,” and therefore
payments to “legitimate charities, where no portion of the payments
ends up in the hands of the foreign official, directly or indirectly,
should not meet this requirement.”75 Another commentator noted that
“[l]egitimate donations to recognized charitable organizations appear
to be exempt from the prohibitions of the FCPA, although they may
nevertheless secure the contract or business as effectively as do
corrupt payments.”76
72. See FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 9, at 22 (instructing readers that in
enacting the FCPA, Congress meant to charge those who “purposefully avoid
actual knowledge” of such behavior).
73. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 § (a)(1)(A)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd3, (amended 1998).
74. Robert J. Meyer, Charitable Donations Under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, in FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT REPORTER 13.2 (2013) (“[A]
potential FCPA violation arises only where the alleged unlawful payment or other
thing of value is given to, or at least inures to the personal financial benefit of, the
foreign official himself.”).
75. Barry A. Sanders, The FCPA and Charitable Donations, in THE LAW OF
TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS § 18:14 (Ved P. Nanda & Ralph B.
Lake eds., 2013).
76. David A. Gantz, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Professional and
Ethical Challenges for Lawyers, 14 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 97, 110 (1997).
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Nevertheless, FCPA settlements and the DOJ’s 2012 Guidance
suggest that a donation to a bona fide foreign charity, even if made in
part to build good will for the donating company, could result in
FCPA liability in the following scenarios.
1. When There Is a “Special Connection” Between a Foreign
Official and the Recipient Entity77
This connection could include, for example, a foreign official
sitting on the Board of the charity. Presumably this same official
with the charity connection would have to be in a position to provide
a “business advantage” to the donating company to meet the
elements of an FCPA anti-bribery violation.
2. When a Foreign Official Has a “Special Interest” in the
Recipient Entity78
The SEC noted in the Schering-Plough case that it was relevant
that the foreign official had a special interest in the success of the
Polish castle restoration charity as founder of the charity. 79 This line
of reasoning clings precariously to a slippery slope: what if a
company donation increases a foreign official’s popularity in a
particular district in advance of a national election (for example, the
company agrees to fund the construction of a new hospital and the
local official makes the new hospital the foundation of his election
campaign)? Is this a “special interest” or “something of value”
sufficient to result in FCPA liability? In the current enforcement
environment, the answer is likely that it could be if the donating
company made the contribution expecting to receive a business
advantage from the official with an interest in the charity.

77. Sanders, supra note 75, § 18:14 (specifying that such a relationship is
questionable if the foreign official founded the charity, the donation is made “in
honor of” the government official, or the gift is to be donated through the
government official).
78. Korenchuk, supra note 35, at 21 (“Issues can arise, for example, if the
charitable entity is connected to a government official (e.g., through a family
member) or is of particular personal interest to the official.”).
79. Complaint, Schering-Plough, supra note 10, at 4 (listing the official’s status
as the manager of the charity as something that should have alerted ScheringPlough to the possible violation of the FCPA through its donations).
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3. When the Donation Is “Made at the Request of” a Foreign
Official80
While one can see how an official requesting a particular donation
would raise an FCPA “red flag,” it is not clear why the fact that an
official requested the donation would, in and of itself, implicate the
FCPA. Presumably such a request is more likely to result in a finding
of “something of value” being received by the requesting official, but
such an additional finding would be required before FCPA liability
might attach.
4. When the Donation Is Made “in Honor of” a Foreign Official81
At least one commentator thinks that donations made “in honor
of” officials should not only fall outside the FCPA, but in fact be
encouraged, as a way to satisfy “corrupt officials’ need for personal
inducements while still avoiding direct bribery.”82 Without
discussing the merits of encouraging such “in honor of” payments,
under the current enforcement regime such payments could result in
liability if the honored official was found to have provided a
“business advantage” for the donating company and prosecutors
found that the payment was made with “corrupt intent.”
5. When the Donation Is “Made to Influence” a Foreign Official
with Regard to a Business Matter83
This is the scenario present in the Schering-Plough and Eli Lilly
cases,84 and is perhaps one of the defining characteristics of a bona
80. Meyer, supra note 74, at 13.1 (“[SEC] staff, as well as prosecutors at the
DOJ, have . . . argued that a bona fide charitable donation made at the behest of a
government official can give rise to an antibribery charge under the Act.”).
81. Sanders, supra note 75, § 18:14 (specifying that such a relationship is
questionable if the foreign official founded the charity, or the donation is made “in
honor of” the government official).
82. Rachel Ehrenfeld, To Fight Foreign Bribery, Try Charity, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 13, 1994, at F13 (reasoning that if American companies did not find such
“loopholes” through the FCPA, the companies would lose competitiveness in the
global market and many Americans would lose their jobs).
83. Order Instituting Proceedings, SEC v. Schering-Plough, No. 04-0945
(D.D.C. 2004), File No. 3-11517 (specifying the attempt at influencing the foreign
official as a reason for the proceedings, despite the status of the charity as bona
fide).
84. Complaint, Schering-Plough, supra note 10, at 4 (specifying that the
attempt at influencing the foreign official violated the FCPA despite the donation
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fide donation that is likely improper under the FCPA. A donation
made to influence a foreign official in a business matter—even if the
donation is made to a bona fide charity—would seem to satisfy the
corrupt intent and business purpose elements of the statute. The
FCPA defines a violation as, inter alia, a payment made to influence
“any act or decision of [a] foreign official in his official capacity.”85
As the SEC noted in the Schering-Plough case, “while the payments
in fact were made to a bona fide charity, they were made to influence
[the foreign official] with respect to the purchase of ScheringPlough’s products.”86

C. DEFINING CHARACTERISTICS OF A PROBLEMATIC DONATION
Donations that could result in FCPA anti-bribery liability typically
have one or more of the following characteristics:
1. Quid Pro Quo
Similar to donations “made to influence,” noted above, donations
specifically made in exchange for some foreign official action or
inaction fall squarely within the FCPA’s anti-bribery provision and
could result in liability.87 The Act prohibits payments to a party or
official made for the purpose of
(i) influencing any act or decision of such party, official, or candidate in
its or his official capacity, (ii) inducing such party, official, or candidate
to do or omit to do an act in violation of the lawful duty of such party,
official, or candidate, or (iii) securing any improper advantage. 88

being made to a bona fide charity); Complaint, Eli Lilly, supra note 67, at 1
(showing that Eli Lilly made the contributions to a charity founded and
administered by a foreign government official at the same time that Eli Lilly
sought to be added to the government’s list of drugs that the government would
reimburse).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2012).
86. Complaint, Schering-Plough, supra note 10, at 4.
87. Compare United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 526 U.S.
398, 404–05 (1999) (noting that, for a finding of bribery under the domestic
bribery statute, “there must be a quid pro quo – a specific intent to give or receive
something of value in exchange for an official act”), with United States v. Bahel,
662 F.3d 610, 638 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that under the gratuity theory of
liability, there need not be a previous agreement to receive benefits in exchange for
a bribe).
88. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3.
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Though not necessary to find an FCPA violation in the current
enforcement environment, specific quid pro quo appears sufficient
for a finding of liability based on regulator guidance and recent
cases, even where no personal financial benefit accrues to the foreign
official.89 Companies that make otherwise bona fide donations in
exchange for, or contingent on, specific action by a foreign official
should anticipate that such payments will be viewed as violations of
the FCPA.
2. Payment Accruing to Foreign Official vs. Other Benefit
As noted above, where an improper payment is made directly or
indirectly to a foreign official, the statute is likely implicated unless a
company can establish a lack of corrupt intent or business purpose.90
However, it seems clear from FCPA cases and the DOJ’s 2012
Guidance that it is not necessary for the payment itself to reach the
foreign official where other circumstances creating a violation are
present—in particular, quid pro quo.91 Some FCPA commentators
have criticized the DOJ’s and SEC’s perceived scope of
prosecutorial authority, analyzing the Act and noting that without a
pecuniary benefit reaching the foreign official personally no
violation can be found. As one commentator notes, “a bona fide
charitable donation will in no way inure to a foreign official’s
personal benefit, and that is the sine qua non of a potential violation.
Absent such a personal benefit, no violation is made out.”92 These
critics point in part to the U.S. domestic bribery statute which, unlike
the FCPA, expressly prohibits “offers or promises [to public
officials] to give anything of value to any other person or entity.” 93
89. This is represented by the Schering-Plough and Eli Lilly cases—payments
made to bona fide charities in exchange for the purchase of company products by
the government, even though there was no allegation that the foreign official in
those cases received any personal financial benefit from the donations, constituted
FCPA violations. In those cases, there was an “incriminating coincidence between
the donations to the charity and the increase in sales obtained” by the companies.
See Giraudo, supra note 24, at 151 (mentioning further that the descriptions of
payments in the charity’s books were suspicious, as were the Manager’s efforts to
keep payments below his authorized level of expenditures).
90. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-3(a)(3), (c)(2).
91. Complaint, Schering-Plough, supra note 10, at 4; Complaint, Eli Lilly,
supra note 67, at 1.
92. Meyer, supra note 74, at 13:2.
93. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1) (2012).
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The argument is that if Congress had intended to include payments to
third parties meant to influence foreign officials as violations of the
FCPA, it would have included similarly explicit language as that
included in the domestic bribery statute.94 This distinction is also
reflected in the sections of the U.S. Attorney Criminal Resource
Manual relating to the domestic bribery statute and the FCPA. When
discussing the domestic bribery statute, the prosecutors’ manual
notes that “with a ‘bribe’ the payment may go to anyone or to
anything and may include campaign contributions.”95 When
discussing the FCPA, the manual states that “[t]he prohibition
extends only to corrupt payments made, directly or indirectly, to a
foreign official, a foreign political party or party official, or any
candidate for foreign public office.”96
The DOJ’s 2012 Guidance notes that payments to governments
(for example, donations to state-managed development funds) are not
covered by the FCPA’s anti-bribery provision, though can be
prosecuted by other federal statutes, including wire fraud and money
laundering.97 The same principle—that payments to governments are
not covered by the anti-bribery provisions—is noted in DOJ’s 2009
Opinion release.98 This guidance seems inconsistent with the SEC’s
positions in Schering-Plough and Eli Lilly where, although only
FCPA accounting violations were charged, the SEC made clear its
view that the payments were improper under the FCPA despite the
fact that they were not made to the foreign official himself. 99 There
94. See Meyer, supra note 74, at 13.2 (“Congress’s failure to include a similar
provision in the FCPA can only be construed as a deliberate determination not to
prohibit such conduct.”); see also U.S. Attorney’s Manual, Title 9 Criminal
Resource Manual § 2041 (Dep’t of Justice 1997) [hereinafter USAM] (finding that
the payment must inure to the personal benefit of the official and does not include
campaign contributions).
95. USAM, supra note 94, § 2041.
96. Id.
97. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 9, at 20.
98. See FCPA 2009 Review, supra note 47 (noting that “the proposed
provision of 100 medical devices and related items and services fall outside the
scope of the FCPA in that the donated products will be provided to the foreign
government, as opposed to individual government officials”).
99. See Complaint, Schering-Plough, supra note 10, at 4 (“[W]hile the
payments in fact were made to a bona fide charity, they were made to influence the
Director with respect to the purchase of Schering-Plough’s products. In fact,
[Schering-Plough] did not view the payments to the Foundation as charitable, but
as ‘dues’ that were required to be paid for assistance from the Director.”); see also
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seems to be no distinction between a payment made to a legitimate
government entity or government-administered development fund
and a payment made to a bona fide charity as was done in ScheringPlough and Eli Lilly.100
Arguments that the FCPA should not cover donations unless a
payment directly or indirectly reaches a foreign official are legally
compelling. Nevertheless, and despite the inconsistent guidance on
the topic, in the current enforcement environment regulators read the
FCPA as potentially criminalizing payments made to bona fide
charities or government funds where they are made in exchange for a
business advantage.101 With limited federal judicial oversight over
FCPA prosecutions and settlements,102 this broader view of the Act’s
coverage remains the state of play today and companies should set
up corporate philanthropy programs with this reality in mind.
3. Corrupt Intent
In order for any payment to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery
provision, the payment must be made “corruptly.”103 Corrupt intent
requires that the payer seeks to influence the recipient to abuse a
governmental role to the benefit of the payer.104 Specifically, the
FCPA legislative history notes that corrupt intent requires that a
payment “must be intended to induce the recipient to misuse his
Complaint, Eli Lilly, supra note 67, at 5 (“[Eli Lilly] requested the approval of the
payments to the Polish Castle Charity with the intent of inducting the Health-Fund
Director to allocate public monies to hospitals and other healthcare providers in the
Health Fund for the purpose of purchasing [Eli Lilly product].”).
100. Complaint, Schering-Plough, supra note 10, at 4; Complaint, Eli Lilly,
supra note 67, at 5.
101. See Complaint, Schering-Plough, supra note 10, at 4; Complaint, Eli Lilly,
supra note 67, at 1.
102. Corporations rarely take FCPA prosecutions to trial due to the perceived
severe negative impact that fighting such a charge would have on the business.
Because a company can be liable for the FCPA violations of its agents, affiliates,
or partner entities, companies subject to prosecution are often spurned during
investigations and any perception that a company is resisting to implement holistic
remedial measures could impact the business longer term. FCPA prosecutions are
public relations nightmares for companies subject to enforcement, and the goal is
typically to wrap up the case as quickly as possible, implement appropriate
remedial measures, and move on.
103. See FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 9, at 14.
104. H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 8 (1977) (stressing that the payment must be
shown to intend to influence the government official to abuse his or her position).
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official position; for example, wrongfully to direct business to the
payer or his client, to obtain preferential legislation or regulations, or
to induce a foreign official to fail to perform an official function.” 105
By this definition, corrupt intent essentially requires something like
quid pro quo—a payment made in exchange for, or in hope or
anticipation of, some business advantage by the official. But
arrangements short of quid pro quo can still meet the corrupt intent
requirement; for example, a donation made without assurance of an
action by the official but in an attempt to sway the official to act on
the payer’s behalf would not qualify as quid pro quo but could
evidence corrupt intent.106
A donation to a bona fide charity, motivated by goodwill intent,
would not satisfy the corrupt intent element of the FCPA and
therefore would not be actionable under the Act.107 In the current
enforcement environment, there is a fine line between legitimate
corporate political and charitable contributions aimed at building
generalized goodwill with local officials and contributions made to
corruptly influence an official to provide an improper business
advantage.108 Because of this fine line, many companies operating in
developing markets are prohibiting political contributions altogether
and carefully monitoring charitable contributions to ensure that line
is not crossed.109 In the end, the best protection is to set a charitable
105. Id.
106. Neither the Schering-Plough nor Eli Lilly case alleged that the Polish castle
charity donations were made pursuant to pre-arranged quid pro quo agreements.
Instead, it was alleged that both companies made the donations in an (ultimately
successful) attempt to induce the official to use his influence to increase the
purchase of their products. See Complaint, Schering-Plough, supra note 10, at 4
(“[W]hile the payments in fact were made to a bona fide charity, they were made
to influence the Director with respect to the purchase of Schering-Plough’s
products.”); see also Complaint, Eli Lilly, supra note 67, at 5 (“[Eli Lilly]
requested the approval of the payments to the Polish Castle Charity with the intent
of inducing the Health-Fund Director to allocate public monies to hospitals and
other healthcare providers in the Health Fund for the purpose of purchasing [Eli
Lilly products].”).
107. See FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 9, at 16, 19 (“The FCPA does not
prohibit charitable contributions or prevent corporations from acting as good
corporate citizens . . . . Legitimate charitable giving does not violate the FCPA.”).
108. See, e.g., United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. 398, 404–05
(1999) (finding that intent can easily transform an official act into bribery and
illegal gratuities).
109. Confidential client information regarding ongoing cases.
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giving plan in advance and avoid contributions tied to, or in any way
related to, specific official action.

IV. AVOIDING PROBLEMATIC DONATIONS:
PRACTICAL POINTS FOR COMPANIES TO
CONSIDER IN CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY
PROGRAMS
Understanding the hallmarks of improper donations can allow
companies to formulate giving programs that minimize risk while
maximizing the goodwill that comes with being a good corporate
citizen. Based on FCPA regulator guidance and settlements, avoiding
problematic donations requires an organized CSR donations program
with the following pillars:


Due diligence. Conducting due diligence on donation recipients
is the lynchpin of responsible corporate giving. In the absence of
due diligence, any contribution could subject the payer to FCPA
liability.110



A pre-approved advance giving plan. Setting contribution plans
(including recipients and amounts) in annual plans well in
advance helps ensure donations are not viewed as reactive or
designed to induce specific governmental action.



No quid pro quo. Donations made in exchange for official action
or inaction should be avoided at all times. 111



Careful documentation and monitoring. The purpose of the
contribution, diligence process and findings, and payment itself
should be carefully documented. Companies should undertake
reasonable monitoring of the contribution and its use. 112 The

110. FCPA 1995 Review, supra note 30 (recounting that the requestor pledged
to do its due diligence to ensure none of the donations would violate the FCPA);
FCPA 2010 Review, supra note 53, at 6 (describing the requestor’s due diligence
and controls concerning potential violations of the FCPA); FCPA Resource Guide,
supra note 9, at 19.
111. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 9, at 19 (noting that companies should
ask, “Is the payment conditioned upon receiving business or other benefits?”).
112. FCPA 2010 Review, supra note 53, at 6; FCPA Resource Guide, supra
note 9, at 19 (instructing companies to consider whether payments are conditioned
upon receiving business benefits before making charitable contributions in foreign
countries).
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appropriate level of monitoring will depend on several factors,
including the size of the donation, the nature of the project
donated to, and the risk environment.

In addition to the above, companies should consider incorporating
into their existing compliance protocols the following practical steps
taken from regulator guidance to minimize the FCPA risk of
corporate donations:


Ensure no connection between the recipient and a foreign official
with the ability to influence the payer’s business. 113



Ensure the contribution is consistent with the payer’s company
policies and giving history.114



Ensure the contribution is transparently given and appropriately
booked in company records. Where possible avoid anonymous
gifts.115



Ensure the specific donation request and recipient did not
originate from a foreign official.116



Ensure contributions are not structured to avoid company giving
limits.117



Obtain certifications or written agreements from the recipients
regarding use of funds, as appropriate based on the size of the
donation and other factors.118

113. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 9, at 19 (stating that the DOJ approved
various charitable contributions in foreign countries based on such due diligence).
114. Id. at 19.
115. In both Schering-Plough and Eli Lilly, the court noted that donations to the
Polish castle charity were improperly characterized in the books and records of the
companies as, for example, rentals of castle space for conferences that never took
place. Complaint, Schering-Plough, supra note 10, at 4; Complaint, Eli Lilly,
supra note 67, at 5.
116. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 9, at 19 (instructing the reader to ask
him or herself if the request for payment has been made by a foreign official before
making a charitable contribution on the part of the donating company).
117. Id. at 17 (using the example of a company that structured its donations as a
violation of the FCPA).
118. FCPA 1997 Review, supra note 37, at 6 (noting the requestor’s due
diligence in managing donating funds as evidence of no violation of FCPA); FCPA
Resource Guide, supra note 9, at 19 (reciting DOJ guidelines that recommend
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While incorporating these protocols can substantially mitigate the
FCPA risk of CSR contributions, they can be costly and timeconsuming to implement, especially for smaller companies. And in
the current enforcement environment, no protocols can provide
complete protection against a potential violation. For this reason,
several possible alterations in the FCPA enforcement regime are
listed below that would better protect companies making good faith
donations and would result in more total contributions reaching bona
fide charities in developing countries.

V. SUGGESTED CHANGES IN U.S. FCPA
ENFORCEMENT REGIME VIS-À-VIS CHARITABLE
CONTRIBUTIONS AND DONATIONS
Countries with higher levels of corruption, and therefore higher
risk of FCPA liability for companies operating therein, are typically
also countries with lower GDP per capita and higher poverty rates.119
Countries with higher levels of corruption can therefore be said to be
in greatest need of charitable assistance. As a result, some argue that
the current aggressive FCPA enforcement environment, and
particularly the lack of clarity on when donations (even to bona fide
charities) may lead to liability, discourages corporate philanthropy in
the countries where those contributions are needed most.120

financial controls and management on the part of the donor to prevent financial
mishandling).
119. See, e.g., Reagan R. Demas, All Hands on Deck: Collaborative Global
Strategies in the Battle Against Corruption and Human Trafficking in Africa, 6 U.
ST. THOMAS L.J. 204 (2009) (noting the connection between corruption and
development); Demas, Moment of Truth, supra note 15, at 324 (citing Gbenga
Lawal, Corruption and Development in Africa: Challenges for Political and
Economic Change, 2 HUMAN. & SOC. SCI. J. 1, 4 (2007) (indicating bribery and
corrupt practices as some of the causes of such poverty)).
120. See, e.g., Andrew B. Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions: Understanding AntiBribery Legislation as Economic Sanctions Against Emerging Markets, 62 FLA. L.
REV. 351, 351 (2010); Francesca M. Pisano, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
and Corporate Charity: Rethinking the Regulations, 62 EMORY L.J. 607 (2013)
(“By discouraging corporate aid, the United States risks not only exacerbating
poverty, but also squandering the opportunity for global leadership.”); William
Nelson, No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: Charitable Contributions and the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 11 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 331 (2013)
(describing the discouragement of giving as a result of the wide application of the
FCPA as the “chilling effect”).
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The need for regulators to ensure that charitable contributions are
not used as conduits for improper payments must be balanced against
the goal of encouraging (or at least not discouraging) corporate
charity in developing countries. Uncertainty in enforcement today
results in increased cost of giving as companies factor in both the
cost of diligence and monitoring as well as the risk of FCPA liability,
which likely reduces the overall volume of legitimate, non-corrupt
corporate giving in the developing world.121 This is surely not the
goal of U.S. regulators, although perhaps an acceptable collateral
consequence for regulators in their fight against corruption.
Certain costs of giving designed to prevent the use of donations
for corrupt purposes are and should be essential, including the cost of
reasonable diligence on, and monitoring of, donation recipients.
However, some revisions in the FCPA or its enforcement are
necessary to provide the clarity companies need to confidently create
generous (and much needed) CSR contribution regimes in
developing countries. This paper suggests four possible changes to
more effectively balance these goals.

A. SAFE HARBOR FOR DONATIONS MADE IN GOOD FAITH
One option is to create a safe harbor for companies that make
donations in good faith to bona fide charities. Donations made to
legitimate charities—authentically recorded in the company’s
records and made in a good faith belief that no specific business
advantage was being received in exchange for the donation—would
be exempt from FCPA prosecution. This safe harbor would allow
companies to give freely and generously to bona fide charities while
still investing appropriate resources into due diligence on recipients
to ensure no quid pro quo was contemplated in the transaction.
At least one commentator has proposed a form of this solution that
would require companies making such donations to disclose the
donation publicly.122 Under that scenario, only donations publicly
disclosed would fall under the safe harbor and be exempt from any
121. Demas, Moment of Truth, supra note 15, at 366 (noting that the FCPA has
resulted in the expenditure of millions of dollars by companies doing due diligence
on donations as well as properly training their staff).
122. See Pisano, supra note 120, at 622 (specifying that such disclosures would
be made to a neutral third party or government entity).
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FCPA liability.123 The idea is that transparency encourages selfpolicing and compliance, and if donations are transparently and
publicly disclosed they are unlikely to be problematic payments that
would give rise to FCPA liability.124 The SEC has pursued this tactic
in other ways, most recently in its rule requiring U.S. issuer
companies involved in resource extraction to disclose certain
payments made to foreign governments.125 However, that rule
specifically excludes “social payments” from those that must be
disclosed,126 presumably because regulators had minimal concern
about the potential for such payments to be used as conduits for
corruption.
The requirement that donations be publicly disclosed in order to
fall within the safe harbor could add additional incentives for
companies to conduct appropriate diligence in advance of making
contributions, but would also create significant additional work for
contributing companies and regulators alike. This work would come
in the form of preparing and vetting public filings and, per one
commentator’s suggestion, the creation of a “monitoring board”
within a neutral organization or government entity to review publicly
disclosed donations and forward transactions it found to be
illegitimate to the DOJ or other appropriate regulator for “traditional
investigation or enforcement.”127 In our view, the risk that an
independent board (potentially itself connected to the government)
might determine on its own that a disclosed contribution was
problematic and refer the same to U.S. regulators would serve as a
significant deterrent for companies to publicly disclose contributions
and could prevent many or most companies from taking part in such
an optional safe harbor program.128 Moreover, in a time of belt-

123. Id. (stating that such a program would encourage transparency and decrease
corruption).
124. Id.
125. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg.
56365 (Sept. 12, 2012).
126. Id. at 56379 (finding that such payments are not part of the local revenue
scheme).
127. Pisano, supra note 120, at 624.
128. If the monitoring board referred a payment to the DOJ, it is not clear that
the company would be awarded the traditional voluntary disclosure and
cooperation credit afforded companies that disclose such payments directly to U.S.
regulators.
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tightening in both the public and private sector, a proposal that would
require companies to expend resources not only on traditional
diligence and monitoring of charitable contributions but also on
publication and interaction with a newly-created regulatory entity is
likely to be met with skepticism by companies considering voluntary
participation.
Nevertheless, a safe harbor that gives contributing companies
exemption from FCPA prosecution where those contributions are
made in good faith and in the absence of quid pro quo can work to
encourage contributions while giving regulators the ability to
prosecute payments that clearly violate the express terms of the
FCPA. In a way, such a safe harbor should already exist under
traditional FCPA liability analysis—DOJ guidance makes clear that
bona fide donations are not problematic unless they are “used as a
vehicle to conceal payments made to corruptly influence foreign
officials”129—so a firm commitment by regulators to this principle
should not limit the scope of cases the DOJ and SEC would wish to
pursue. It would, however, provide valuable clarity to companies
seeking to become better corporate citizens in the developing world.

B. IMMUNITY FOR DONATIONS TO RECIPIENTS ON EMBASSY LISTS
Another possible approach to encourage companies operating in
high-risk markets to provide charitable contributions to bona fide
recipients would involve facilitation of donations by local embassies
in those countries. Under this scenario, the U.S. embassy would
agree to maintain a list of bona fide recipient charitable organizations
that it has vetted and approved based on its experience in the country
and insight it can readily obtain from local sources.130 U.S.
companies seeking to donate to bona fide recipients, but also looking
to limit the risk of FCPA liability in those donations would request
the approved list of recipients from the U.S. embassy and choose to
donate to a recipient on that list. These donations could even be
given through the embassy, which would pass the contribution on to
129. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 9, at 19 (asserting that the DOJ does not
seek to outlaw charitable giving, but charitable giving is often used as a vehicle for
bribery).
130. U.S. embassies around the world often compile and maintain lists of this
nature—for example, lists of reputable local law firms—that they make freely
available to U.S. companies and individuals.
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the bona fide recipient, although the logistics of the embassy serving
as a financial intermediary to the transaction might overly complicate
the scenario and require difficult-to-obtain U.S. government
approvals.
Companies that wish to donate to a recipient not on the U.S.
embassy list could submit the name of the proposed recipient to the
embassy, which would either confirm the bona fide nature of the
recipient and add it to the list, or reject the proposed recipient based
on information it has or could readily obtain. Donations made to
recipients on the embassy list would be presumptively bona fide and
therefore not subject to FCPA liability in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence that the donation was given as quid pro quo—in
exchange for specific action or inaction by a government official.
Donations given to one of the embassy list recipients with the intent
to build goodwill, and even donations made at the request of
officials, would be presumptively proper and therefore not subject to
FCPA liability. Companies could choose to contribute to entities not
on the list, but those contributions would not be covered by the
presumption of appropriateness and would be subject to review by
U.S. regulators in the same way as are donations made today.
Resources within each U.S. embassy would need to be dedicated
to vetting potential recipients and maintaining the recipient lists.
Other non-U.S. embassies approved by the U.S. government could
either maintain separate lists or contribute to the U.S. embassy list in
a given country, which would have the additional benefit of
encouraging discussion and interaction between country stations
regarding the impact of and interplay between charitable
contributions and corruption.

C. EXCEPTION FOR INDUSTRY POOLING OF CHARITABLE
CONTRIBUTIONS
A third option would involve the creation of a safe harbor for
donations made pursuant to industry pooling agreements. In many
circumstances, companies already work with partners and even
competitors in their industry to confirm local charitable requirements
and conduct due diligence on donation recipients.131 Under this

131. Confidential client information regarding ongoing cases.
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proposal, U.S. regulators would encourage more formal charitable
cooperation regimes within industries by agreeing to provide
immunity from FCPA prosecution for contributions made pursuant to
transparent industry pooling agreements. Such pooling arrangements
would require a certain number of committed industry participants,
publication of donation recipients, and appropriate diligence
conducted on ultimate recipients. Companies would contribute to a
joint fund that was then distributed to the approved recipients,
according to a pre-approved contribution plan, by a committee
comprised of representatives of participating companies. Recipients
would be publicized, although details on contribution amounts would
not need to be.
This arrangement would significantly reduce the likelihood that
contributions made would be corrupt under the FCPA, since no
individual company could be receiving an improper advantage over
competitors if their donations were being made jointly with some or
all of their competitors and other market participants. Recognizing
the importance companies place on goodwill that results from
donations, companies would have the right to publicize the nature
and amount of their individual contributions to the overall donation.
Contributing companies would of course still be required to
appropriately book contributions made via pooling agreements in
their own records and, as with the other proposals above, evidence of
specific quid pro quo (payments made in exchange for specific
business advantage) would pull even pooled contributions outside of
the safe harbor and subject them to traditional FCPA scrutiny by
regulators.

D. SUPPLEMENTAL PUBLISHED GUIDANCE FROM REGULATORS
Finally, in the absence of a clearly defined safe harbor as proposed
above, companies operating in high-risk countries who wish to
design risk-mitigating CSR contribution programs need supplemental
direction from U.S. regulators that clarifies key issues that remain
unresolved in the wake of the DOJ’s 2012 Guidance. Published
supplemental guidance that clarifies, for example, that donations to
bona fide entities, where a foreign official receives no tangible
(financial or in-kind) benefit and no clear quid pro quo exists, will
not be subject to FCPA liability would help temper fears that bona
fide charitable contributions can still lead to enforcement action.
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Another area where supplemental guidance is necessary relates to
the depth of diligence U.S. regulators expect companies to conduct
on donations made to government entities or government-run
charities. In at least two recent non-public scenarios from two
separate continents, companies were asked to make donations to a
local government and municipal development fund (either in-kind or
monetary) and expressed uncertainty regarding the level of diligence
they were expected to conduct on the government entity recipient. 132
Once given to a government or government-managed development
fund, must contributing companies monitor how donated funds are
distributed by the government? The DOJ’s 2012 Guidance and
several of its Opinion Releases state clearly that payments to
governments are not covered by the FCPA,133 but under current
enforcement trends a payment to a local development fund that was
later plundered by a foreign official or even spent on a project
specifically designed to benefit that official could lead to FCPA
liability, depending on how regulators gauged the level of diligence
and monitoring undertaken by the company. Greater guidance as to
this expected level of diligence and monitoring is precisely what
contributing companies are looking for.
As a final example, companies also need clear guidance on when
compelled giving can constitute an FCPA violation. Compelled
giving—when a company is required by applicable local law to make
a donation or contribution to a particular recipient—is common in
the developing world. For example, companies operating in
Equatorial Guinea are required to donate annually to community
projects and the Equatorial Guinean government has been known to
provide a list of donation recipients from which companies must
choose.134 Companies in many West African nations, including
Nigeria and Angola, are required to enter into joint ventures with
local partners to operate in the oil and gas sector.135 In its 2010
Opinion Release, the DOJ noted that the requesting company was
being compelled to make the proposed grant to a local entity by

132. Confidential client information regarding ongoing cases.
133. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 9, at 19.
134. Confidential client information regarding ongoing cases.
135. Confidential client information regarding ongoing cases; see Nelson, supra
note 120, at 358–59.
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regulators in that country.136 While it is clear from DOJ guidance and
cases that economic coercion is not a defense under the FCPA, 137 it
seems reasonable for regulators to clarify that legally-compelled
giving, in the absence of clear quid pro quo, will not be viewed as
problematic under the Act.
To ensure that additional questions regarding FCPA enforcement
in the context of CSR contributions are answered, the DOJ and SEC
could open the Guidance up to public comment in the same way that
regulators do for SEC Proposed Rules.138 This would allow
companies to submit concerns and clarifying questions and ensure
the finished product provided clarity on most, if not all, issues that
remain uncertain for Compliance and Legal Officers overseeing
operations in high-risk countries.

VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the DOJ’s 2012 Guidance on the FCPA, uncertainty
remains. One of the areas of continuing ambiguity relates to CSR
contributions and donations. Those corporations seeking to
contribute to charitable causes while operating in the developing
world are not sure which contributions could lead to liability under
the FCPA. While corporations have been provided certain steps to
minimize risk, more should be done to ensure that the use of
charitable contributions as conduits for corruption is deterred while
fully encouraging bona fide corporate philanthropy. Certain
refinements in application and enforcement of the FCPA can
accomplish just that.

136. See FCPA 2010 Review, supra note 53 (explaining that the investor was
forced to make a donation to an institution on a short list of institutions).
137. See FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 9, at 27 (“Mere economic coercion,
however, does not amount to extortion. As Congress noted when it enacted the
FCPA: ‘The defense that the payment was demanded on the part of a government
official as a price for gaining entry into a market or to obtain a contract would not
suffice since at some point the U.S. company would make a conscious decision
whether or not to pay a bribe.’”).
138. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg.
56366–67 (Sept. 12, 2012).

